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This  paper  aims  at  providing  some  new  theoretical  support  for  money  demand  functions  in 
monetary hyperinflation analysis given the well known failure of Cagan based inflationary finance 
models  to produce explosive  hyperinflation. An analytical approach  is used to  characterize the 
agents’ preferences which are compatible with monetary hyperinflation. In the context of a MIUF 
model, we show that the possibility of explosive hyperinflation paths depends on a sufficient level 
of  money  essentiality  in  the  sense  of  Scheinkman  (1980)  which  is  conveyed  by  the  agents’ 
preferences. This result emerges without any ad-hoc assumption implying the inclusion of some 
friction  in  the  adjustment  of  some  nominal  variable.  It  suggests  that  monetary  hyperinflation 
analysis  under perfect foresight requires abandoning the Cagan money demand and adopting a 
demand  for  money  respecting  money  essentiality.  Theoretical  support  is  brought  to  inelastic 
functional forms of money demand and specifically to the double-log schedule. 
 
 
JEL classification: E31, E41 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hyperinflationary episodes are characterized by an unstable dynamic process where inflation speeds 
up, real money balances tend to vanish and the public deficit is financed by issuing money. These 
processes are monetary hyperinflations
2. Any model of hyperinflation should be consistent with 
these former salient stylized facts. Traditional models of hyperinflation view hyperinflation as the 
result of an inflationary finance policy generating a speeding up inflation process driven by an 
accelerating rise in the money supply as a means of raising revenues for the government by using an 
inflation tax. Usual inflationary finance models, such as Evans and Yarrow (1981) or Bruno and 
Fischer (1990), rely on the famous Cagan (1956) money demand. These models are so influential in 
the  literature  that  small  variations  of  them  can  be  found  in  several  major  textbooks,  such  as 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Walsh (2003) or Romer (2006) for 
instance. They imply the possibility of dual equilibria and the existence of an inflation tax Laffer 
curve. 
 
However, since the ‘surprising monetarist arithmetic’ analysed in Buiter (1987) it is known that 
under perfect foresight these models are fundamentally flawed because they are not capable of 
generating accelerating inflation. It is now well recognized that all models which generate the high 
inflation trap defined by Bruno and Fischer (1990) have this fundamental flaw
3. As most of the 
large empirical literature on hyperinflation (Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000), Slavova (2003) or 
Georgoutsos and Kouretas (2004) among recent works) relies on the Cagan model with rational 
expectations, this failure could cast doubt on several empirical studies. Evans and Yarrow (1981) 
and Bernholz and Gersbach (1992) already pointed out that the crucial condition for generating 
hyperinflation is that real money balances should not decrease more than inflation increases with 
high rates of inflation. The failure of the inflationary finance models of hyperinflation to produce 
explosive inflation processes under rational expectations or perfect foresight is the stimulus for a 
significant amount of new literature and some new specifications of this class of models. 
 
These new specifications can be mainly separated in two different approaches depending on the 
kind of feature included in the basic inflationary finance model to guarantee the former crucial 
condition. In the first approach, the models include a sufficiently large friction in the adjustment of 
some nominal variable like expected inflation, money holdings or the exchange rate. Sufficiently 
slow adaptive expectations, as in Evans and Yarrow (1981) or Bruno and Fischer (1990), learning 
as in Marcet and Nicolini (2003), a crawling peg rule for the exchange rate as in Bruno (1989), or a 
sufficiently slow adaptive adjustment on the money market as in Kiguel (1989) can restore the 
correct running of this class of models. However, even if one can find arguments in favour of the 
use of adaptive expectations during hyperinflationary episodes, as Bruno and Fischer (1990) or 
Cukierman  (1988)  do  for  instance,  it  is  hard  to  justify  the  persistent  presence  of  behaviours 
involving either systematic forecast mistakes or maladjustments resulting in prohibitive costs for the 
agents in a hyperinflationary context. In the second approach, assuming that agents respond most 
likely instantaneously to changes in inflation during hyperinflation the models maintain perfect 
foresight  but  abandon  Cagan  money  demand  function.  Ashworth  and  Evans  (1998)  look  for 
empirical  support  for  other  functional  forms  than  the  Cagan  money  demand.  Vazquez  (1998), 
Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) or Barbosa, Cunha and Sallum (2006) using analytical approaches 
resort to first principles in the framework of inflationary finance monetary optimizing models. The 
model proposed in this paper belongs to this second group. 
 
                                                
2 The point of this paper is on monetary hyperinflations and should be distinguished from that of other works such as 
Brock (1975), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Barbosa and da Cunha (2003) focusing on speculative hyperinflations. 
Speculative hyperinflations, as defined by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), are explosive price-level paths unrelated to 
monetary growth. 
3 See Evans (1995) for a survey of this literature.   3 
This paper addresses the issue of the replacement of Cagan money demand for the analysis of 
hyperinflation under perfect foresight. The aim of the paper is to provide theoretical support for 
alternative functional forms of money demand functions during hyperinflation in a perfect foresight 
environment. We use an analytical approach based on a perfect foresight optimizing model with 
money-in-the-utility-function (henceforth called MIUF model) drawing on Brock (1975) model. 
This model represents a way of capturing the role of money as a medium of exchange. Our precise 
aim  is  to  characterize  agents’  preferences  that  are  compatible  with  explosive  monetary 
hyperinflation.  The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  show  that  modelling  monetary 
hyperinflation  with  perfect  foresight  is  closely  linked  to  the  concept  of  money  essentiality  as 
defined  by  Scheinkman  (1980).  Explosive  monetary  hyperinflation  is  possible  under  perfect 
foresight only if money is sufficiently essential to the system. Cagan model can be considered as a 
special  case  of  the  MIUF  model  but  Cagan  money  demand  doesn’t  comply  with  the  money 
essentiality requirement and should be abandoned in this framework. Using these results theoretical 
support  is  brought  to  a  general  class  of  inflation-inelastic  money  demand  functional  forms 
complying with the money essentiality requirement and especially to the double-log money demand 
function joining the empirical support brought by Ashworth and Evans (1998). 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the MIUF model and shows that modelling 
monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight requires a sufficient level of money essentiality; 
section 3 relates money essentiality to money demand inelasticity and provides specific theoretical 
support to the double-log functional form of the money demand during hyperinflation; section 4 
summarizes the results. 
 
 
2. Monetary dynamics of hyperinflation and money essentiality 
 
The optimizing monetary model considered in this paper assumes a continuous time model where 
the economy consists of a large number of identical infinitely-lived forward looking households 
endowed  with  perfect  foresight.  Population  is  constant  and  its  size  is  normalized  to  unity  for 
convenience. There is no uncertainty. Each household has a non-produced constant endowment 
0 y >  of the non-storable consumption good per unit of time. 
 
In the money-in-the-utility-function model the role of money as a medium of exchange is assumed 
to be captured by introducing real money balances into the household utility function. The set up 
draws on Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975). 
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The instantaneous utility function is additive and separable in 
t c , the household’s consumption at 







=  his holdings of real monetary balances, M is the nominal stock of money, P is 
the price level. The functions u and v are increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. r is the 
constant subjective discount rate, which, following Calvo (1987), is assumed to be equal to the real 
rate of interest. Financial wealth and the nominal interest rate are, respectively, defined as 
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where  t b denotes real per capita government debt,  t p is the inflation rate. The household’s budget 
constraint is 
 
( ) t t t t t t y r c i m w t w = - + - + ￿ ,         (2) 
 
where a dot on a variable represents its first derivative with respect to time, and t t is a lump-sum tax 














,          (3) 
 
where c is time-invariant because the instantaneous rate of time preference is equal to the real rate 
of interest. Condition (3) requires that at each moment the nominal rate of interest be equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money. It implicitly defines a demand for money as 
a function of the nominal interest rate i. The strict concavity of v ensures that m and i are related in a 
negative fashion. The optimum solution must also obey the following transversality condition: 
 
( ) lim 0
rt
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The  latter  first-order  equation  (3)  and  the  transversality  condition  (4)  can  be  re-written,  after 
normalizing the constant value of  ( ) u c ¢ to unity for convenience, as: 
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In usual inflationary finance models a constant per capita share of government’s budget deficit, d, is 








p = = +
￿
￿ .          (7) 
 
Substituting the value of p  extracted from first-order equation (5) in the latter expression leads to 
the inflationary finance model dynamics described by the following law of motion for real cash 
balances where we drop time index t for convenience: 
 
( ) ( ) m d v m r m ¢ = - - ￿ .        (8) 
 
The differential equation (8) provides a complete characterization of real per-capita money balances 
dynamics which will be studied by using the technique of phase diagram on[ [ 0;+¥ . The main 
interesting point here is to examine whether this law of motion for real cash balances is able to 
produce monetary hyperinflation paths. A monetary hyperinflation path will be observed if the law 
of motion presents a path leading to a zero level of real cash balances. Therefore, the conditions for 
this kind of paths should be identified. As the mathematical function representing the law of motion   5 
is continuous (which is true with standard assumptions on  u and v) this kind of  paths will be 
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The calculation of  lim
m m
®+¥
￿  will assess the existence of any steady state. However, whatever the 




+ ® < ￿   is met. 
 
At this stage a second highly important point should be made clear. According to Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1983) in the context of speculative hyperinflations issue, any path leading to a zero value of 
real cash balances and crossing eventually the vertical axis at some finite point should be ruled out 
on grounds that such paths would not be feasible because the real stock of money would eventually 
become negative. However, we would rather follow the point made by Barbosa and Cunha (2003) 
who contested the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) approach by arguing that on such hyperinflationary 
paths when the real quantity of money reaches zero hyperinflation would have wiped out the value 
of money, the opportunity cost of holding money would have become infinite, and the economy 
would no longer be a monetary economy. Therefore, we follow the point made by Barbosa and 
Cunha  (2003)  and  consider  the  monetary  hyperinflation  paths  corresponding  to  the  condition 
0 lim 0
m m
+ ® < ￿  as perfect foresight competitive equilibrium paths. 
 
Moreover,  it’s  important  to  stress  that  these  possible  hyperinflationary  paths  are  monetary 
hyperinflations  because  along  these  paths  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  money  supply  explodes. 






,             
  
we see that along these paths of continuously declining m, given that  0, d > the growth rate of 
money supply increases continuously. 
 
In  this  respect,  according  to  the  law  of  motion  (8),  the  possibility  of  explosive  monetary 
hyperinflation will depend on the condition 
 
[ ]
0 0 lim lim ( ) 0
m m m d mv m
+ + ® ®
¢ = - < ￿ ,      (10) 
 
which is equivalent to the following condition 
 
[ ]
0 lim ( )
m mv m d
+ ®
¢ > .        (11) 
 
The  latter  condition  is  basically  a  condition  about  a  sufficient  level  of  money  essentiality. 
Scheinkman (1980) related the condition 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ >  to the essentiality of money i.e. the fact 
that “money is very necessary to the system”. The definition of money essentiality relates to the 
evolution of inflation tax collected by government when the rate of inflation explodes. Money is 
considered as essential if the inflation tax collected by the government does not tend to zero when 
the rate of inflation explodes. From (7) we see that seigniorage obtained by printing money can be   6 
decomposed into two components, the change in the real stock of money and the inflation tax  m p  
which can be written, according to equation (5): 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) m v m r m mv m rm p ¢ ¢ = - = - .        (12) 
 
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes we have 
 
0 0 lim lim ( )
m m m mv m p
+ + ® ®
¢ = .        (13) 
 
Therefore, when 
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ >  then 
0 lim 0
m m p
+ ® >  and money is essential. These findings enable us 
to formulate a first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In a MIUF optimizing monetary framework with additive separable utility function, 
explosive  monetary  hyperinflations  are  possible  only  if  money  is  sufficiently  essential  that  is 
if [ ]
0 lim ( )
m mv m d
+ ®
¢ > . 
 
Proof: The proof relies on the previous arguments and can be illustrated by the phase diagram 
depicted on Figure 1. The precise shape of the phase diagram depends on the first and second 
derivative of  m ￿  with respect to m. Other shapes than that depicted below could be possible. The 
important point for the analysis conducted here is the condition for
0 lim 0
m m
+ ® < ￿ . If lim 0
m m
®+¥ > ￿ , the 
locus m ￿  will cross the horizontal axis at least once. We consider here a unique unstable steady state 
* m but the qualitative analysis for hyperinflationary paths doesn’t change in the case of more steady 
states. All paths originating at the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out 





Figure 1: Monetary dynamics when
0 lim ( )
m mv m d
+ ®
¢ >  
 
Using a similar MIUF framework with a particular constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function 
Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) point out that explosive hyperinflationary dynamics are more likely 
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when the transaction role of money becomes important. Our results confirm the point made by 
Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) by relating, more generally, the possibility of monetary explosive 
hyperinflations to a sufficient level of money essentiality in the model. 
 
At this stage it is important to stress that Cagan semi-logarithmic money demand schedule doesn’t 
comply with money essentiality requirement. Then, according to Proposition 1, the failure of the 
Cagan inflationary finance model to produce monetary hyperinflations is not surprising. 
 
Proposition 2: Cagan money demand does not comply with money essentiality. 
 
Proof: The Cagan ad-hoc model relying on the Cagan money demand can be considered as a 
special case of the MIUF model developed here. Since Kingston (1982), it is known that the semi-
log schedule is ‘integrable’. In the terms of Kingston (1982) it means that the schedule ‘can be 
generated by at least one optimizing framework’. The ‘integrability’ of Cagan money demand was 
shown again later by Calvo and Leiderman (1992). Thus, it is known that using a utility function for 
money services v(m) such as : 
 
( ) ( )
1 1 log for all 0
r v m r m m m e
g a a g a
- + = + + - < < ,    (14) 
 
in  the  first-order  equation  (5)  will  found  the  famous  semi-logarithmic  Cagan  money  demand 
(logm g ap = - , where  g  is a constant and  a  a positive constant) and the current MIUF model 
will resume in the inflationary finance Cagan model. However, such a utility function for money 
services  doesn’t  comply  with  money  essentiality  requirement  since  for  the  former  utility 
function
0 lim ( ) 0
m mv m
+ ®
¢ = . Then, it won’t allow the modelling of monetary hyperinflation as stated in 
Proposition 1.￿ 
 
Modelling monetary hyperinflation under perfect foresight requires assuming money essentiality. 
This implies abandoning the Cagan money demand for the analysis of monetary hyperinflation in a 




3. Money essentiality, money demand inelasticity and monetary hyperinflation 
 
Money essentiality is closely related to the inelasticity of the demand for money with respect to the 
cost of holding cash balances. We define the function  ( ) s m measuring the cost of money services 
according to 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) s m mi m r mv m p ¢ = = + = .        (15) 
 
The first derivative of  ( ) s m is 
1
( ) 1 1
m i
s m i i
i m e
￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ ¢ = + = - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ¶ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.      (16) 
 
where e  represents the elasticity of the money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. If 
the money demand is interest-rate inelastic, 1 e < , then  ( ) 0 s m ¢ < . 
     8 
Since  ( ) 0 s m ³   and  ( ) 0 s m ¢ <   when  the  money  demand  is  inelastic,  it  follows 
that
0 0 lim ( ) lim ( ) 0
m m s m mv m
+ + ® ®
¢ = > .  Thus,  when  money  demand  is  interest  rate-inelastic,  money  is 
essential. 
 
Proposition  3:  Any  money  demand  function  inelastic  with  respect  to  the  cost  of  holding  cash 
balances  and  such  that 
0 0 lim ( ) lim ( )
m m s m mv m d
+ + ® ®
¢ = >   will  allow  the  modelling  of  monetary 
hyperinflation under perfect foresight. 
 
Proof: The proof relies on Proposition 1. More specifically, combining equations (15) and (8) leads 
to the law of motion describing monetary dynamics 
 
( ) ( ) m d rm mv m d rm s m ¢ = + - = + - ￿ .         
 
Given that  ( ) 0 s m ¢ <  when money demand is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate it 
follows that the increasing locus describing m ￿  in Figure 1 represents the monetary dynamics for an 












Barbosa et al (2006), in a similar framework, point out the role of the inelasticity of money demand 
functions with respect to the nominal interest rate for the possibility of explosive inflation path but 
insist in the need of an increasing government deficit. Our results stress, rather, the role of money 
essentiality and are established with a constant government deficit without needing an increasing 
deficit. 
 
Inelastic money demand function complying with a sufficient level of money essentiality can be 
candidates for replacing the famous Cagan money demand function to model successfully monetary 
hyperinflation under perfect foresight. Among them we may consider the double-log schedule: 
 
log log , 0 1 m d b p b = - < <  .      (17) 
 
This money demand functional form exhibits a constant elasticity lower than one with respect to the 
inflation rate. 
 
Proposition 4: The double-log schedule described by (17) is an appropriate candidate functional 
form to replace Cagan money demand function in the analysis of monetary hyperinflation under 
perfect foresight. 
 
Proof: As shown by Kingston (1982), the double-log schedule is ‘integrable’. One can easily verify 














= + ,          (18) 
 
will  found  the  double-log  schedule.  The  money  demand  function  described  by  the  double-log 
schedule given by (17) complies with Proposition 1 as shown by the following calculation: 
   9 
0 lim ( )
m mv m d
+ ®
¢ = +¥ > . 
 
It therefore complies with the sufficient level of money essentiality requirement. Figure 2 represents 
the monetary dynamics derived from the double-log schedule under perfect foresight. All paths 
starting at the left of the unique unstable steady state 
* m  are monetary hyperinflations. The paths 




Figure 2: monetary dynamics with the double-log schedule 
 
Proposition 4 provides theoretical support for the use of the double-log schedule for money demand 





This paper provides some new guidelines for investigation of monetary hyperinflation under perfect 
foresight  given  the  well  known  failure  of Cagan  based  inflationary  finance  models to  produce 
explosive hyperinflation. We address the issue of the replacement of the famous Cagan money 
demand  for  the  analysis  of  explosive  hyperinflation  under  perfect  foresight  in  traditional 
inflationary finance models. An analytical approach is used to characterize the agents’ preferences 
which are compatible with monetary hyperinflation. In the context of a MIUF model, we show that 
the possibility of explosive hyperinflation paths depends on a sufficient level of money essentiality 
in  the  sense  of  Scheinkman  (1980)  which  is  conveyed  by  the  agents’  preferences.  This  result 
emerges without any ad-hoc assumption implying the inclusion of some friction in the adjustment 
of some nominal variable. Further research should be conducted to assess the robustness of this 
result to a MIUF model with a general utility function or to alternative ways of modelling the 
transaction role of money like a cash-in-advance economy. 
 
This  sufficient  money  essentiality  requirement  should  not  be  surprising.  As  pointed  out  by 
Gutierrez  and  Vazquez  (2004),  money  becomes  more  essential  for  purchasing  goods  during 
hyperinflation than during stable periods because extreme inflation dramatically decreases credit 
m ￿  
 
m  0 
* m  10 
transactions and in general the use of long term contracts
4. Moreover, a sufficient level of money 
essentiality is crucial in inflationary finance models of hyperinflation since the government needs 
the  money  to  be  essential  to  the  system  in  order  to  get  sufficient  inflation  tax  when  inflation 
explodes. Cagan famous demand for money is shown not to comply with the money essentiality 
requirement explaining the failure of the Cagan inflationary finance model to produce monetary 
hyperinflations and justifying the issue of its replacement. 
 
Money essentiality is shown to be closely linked to the inelasticity of money demand with respect 
to the cost of holding cash balances. A particular class of inelastic money demand functions is 
identified as appropriate candidates to replace the Cagan money demand function in the analysis of 
explosive hyperinflation in inflationary finance models. In this class of inelastic money demand 
functions, theoretical support is provided to the double-log schedule. Ashworth and Evans (1998) 
looking for alternative functional forms for money demand under hyperinflation provide empirical 
support for the double-log schedule. Therefore, the double-log schedule may be a possible and 
appropriate  candidate  functional  form  to  give  an  alternative  to  the  failure  of  Cagan  based 
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